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A B S T R A C T   
Drawing on the concept of a gale of creative destruction in a capitalistic economy, we argue that initiatives to 
assess the robustness of findings in the organizational literature should aim to simultaneously test competing 
ideas operating in the same theoretical space. In other words, replication efforts should seek not just to support 
or question the original findings, but also to replace them with revised, stronger theories with greater ex-
planatory power. Achieving this will typically require adding new measures, conditions, and subject populations 
to research designs, in order to carry out conceptual tests of multiple theories in addition to directly replicating 
the original findings. To illustrate the value of the creative destruction approach for theory pruning in organi-
zational scholarship, we describe recent replication initiatives re-examining culture and work morality, working 
parents’ reasoning about day care options, and gender discrimination in hiring decisions. 
Significance statement: It is becoming increasingly clear that many, if not most, published research findings across 
scientific fields are not readily replicable when the same method is repeated. Although extremely valuable, failed 
replications risk leaving a theoretical void— reducing confidence the original theoretical prediction is true, but 
not replacing it with positive evidence in favor of an alternative theory. We introduce the creative destruction 
approach to replication, which combines theory pruning methods from the field of management with emerging 
best practices from the open science movement, with the aim of making replications as generative as possible. In 
effect, we advocate for a Replication 2.0 movement in which the goal shifts from checking on the reliability of 
past findings to actively engaging in competitive theory testing and theory building. 
Scientific transparency statement: The materials, code, and data for this article are posted publicly on the Open 
Science Framework, with links provided in the article.   
1. Introduction 
As Meehl (1978, p. 817) writes, it is the job of scientists to “subject 
theories… to grave danger of refutation… A theory is corroborated to 
the extent that we have subjected it to such risky tests; the more dan-
gerous tests it has survived, the better corroborated it is.” We suggest 
that for too long, theories in the organizational and psychological lit-
eratures have been akin to domesticated animals—sheltered and nur-
tured by supporters, rather than subject to the fitness and survival 
pressures Meehl (1978), Popper (1963), and others envisioned. 
Indeed, organizational scholars have long lamented the prolifera-
tion of new theories within management research (Hambrick, 2007), 
with meaningful attempts at theory reduction remaining largely absent 
from the literature (Aguinis, Pierce, Bosco, & Muslin, 2009; Leavitt, 
Mitchell, & Peterson, 2010). Platt (1964) used the term strong inference 
to describe at a high level how faster-moving sciences tend to pit the-
ories against one another to accelerate progress (see also Albertini, 
2017). To address this challenge, management scholars have slowly 
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T
adopted a loosely described set of techniques known as “theory 
pruning,” which are defined as theory testing techniques which “can 
move us in the direction of limiting, bounding, and perhaps reducing 
theory” (Leavitt et al., 2010). 
Concerns about theory proliferation are compounded by the limited 
number of studies focusing on replication (Bergh, Sharp, Aguinis, & Li, 
2017; Earp & Trafimow, 2015; Lykken, 1968; Tsang & Kwan, 1999; 
Brandt et al., 2014), and new findings regarding a general lack of re-
plicability within organizational scholarship (Bergh et al., 2017; Bosco, 
Aguinis, Field, Pierce, & Dalton, 2016). Accordingly, commentators 
have recently described the risk of a crisis of confidence in organiza-
tional research (Gelman, 2015; Köhler & Cortina, in press). Thus, while 
scholars continue to generate new theory at an accelerated pace, their 
propositions typically enjoy preliminary rather than definitive support, 
and are rarely subjected to attempts at direct replication (Schmidt, 
2009; Simons, 2014) or placed in competition against adjacent (and 
sometimes contradictory) theories. 
The current paper introduces and applies the concept of creative 
destruction of management and psychological theory, wherein best 
practices for replication and transparency (Nosek, Spies, & Motyl, 2012; 
Open Science Collaboration, 2015) are combined with epistemological 
strategies of theory pruning. The goal is to draw strong inferences 
(Platt, 1964) by carrying out severe tests (Mayo, 2018) of two or more 
competing theories that occupy shared theoretical space. We begin by 
identifying the limits of traditional approaches to bounding theory, and 
define the optimal features of the creative destruction approach. To 
illustrate how the creative destruction paradigm provides information 
gain beyond either traditional replication or theory pruning methods, 
we describe the results of recent initiatives to revisit findings regarding 
the role of a Puritan-Protestant heritage in American work morality, as 
well as motivated reasoning on the part of would-be parents facing 
difficult child care choices. We also report a combined direct and 
conceptual replication (Crandall & Sherman, 2016; Schmidt, 2009; 
Simons, 2014) of past work on psychological rationalizations for gender 
discrimination. This original data collection is used as a vehicle to test 
four theories of hiring decisions involving female and male candidates, 
specifically motivated gender discrimination, assimilation to cognitive 
expectations, motivated liberal ideologies, and study savviness. Under 
the taxonomy of replications introduced by Köhler and Cortina (in 
press), these investigations constitute semi-independent replications 
rather than independent replications, since they include one member of 
the original research team. 
In each case, high-powered and in some cases cross-national sam-
ples, combined with pre-registered (Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, 
van der Maas, & Kievit, 2012) empirical predictions from each theo-
retical perspective, allow for strong inferences (Platt, 1964) in the ab-
sence of publication bias (Kvarven et al., in press). In addition to re-
peating the original design, we systematically include further measures, 
conditions, and populations, allowing for novel tests of competing 
theoretical accounts operating in the same domains. We suggest that 
the creative destruction paradigm can serve the long-sought goal of 
encouraging the development of new theories and insights for the study 
of management and organizations, while also rigorously pruning and 
bounding theories as they emerge (Porter, 1996). 
2. The need for theory pruning in management scholarship 
Scientific theories are like toothbrushes—no one wants to use 
anyone else’s (Mischel, 2008). Editors and reviewers at journals, and 
selection and promotion committees at universities, reward the in-
troduction of new theoretical ideas more so than adjudicating between 
existing theories. A study of prestigious medical journals found that the 
outlets with the highest impact factors preferred publishing novel re-
search, not necessarily the most robust research (Evangelou, Siontis, 
Pfeiffer, & Ioannidis, 2012). The professional incentive to develop one’s 
own distinctive intellectual brand leads to a proliferation of theories, 
frameworks, and models (Köhler & Cortina, in press; Hambrick, 2007; 
Mischel, 2008), many of these attracting relatively little attention from 
other scientists. As a result, theories in social and organizational psy-
chology are rarely made vulnerable to disproof. 
Pitting competing empirical predictions against one another in the 
same experimental paradigm provides the opportunity to bound, qua-
lify, and reduce theory (Aguinis et al., 2009; Hambrick, 2007; Kluger & 
Tikochinsky, 2001; Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006; Vandenberg & Grelle, 
2008). By directly considering and testing theories in tandem, scholars 
are able to determine the necessity of additional constructs introduced 
by a novel theory, or identify which of two theories provides predictive 
validity across a broader range of criteria (Leavitt et al., 2010). Such an 
approach may generate support for one theoretical explanation over 
another (Schlaegel & Koenig, 2014), reconcile apparent contradictions 
that are later explained by differences in assumptions underlying di-
vergent theoretical orientations (Peteraf, Di Stefano, & Verona, 2013), 
or facilitate new discovery by identifying previously hidden moderators 
that emerge when one theory directly antagonizes another (Latham, 
Erez, & Locke, 1988). 
To date, five general categories of theory pruning strategies have 
been identified, with definitiveness for identifying a champion between 
two theories increasing with the more sophisticated strategies (Leavitt 
et al., 2010). First, scholars may simply apply a basic parsimony test of 
the two theories, and demonstrate that the novel constructs from one 
theory add additional predictive variance beyond those constructs 
present in both theories (e.g., Barrick & Zimmerman, 2005). A second 
approach involves comparing two models (one more parsimonious than 
the other) which “nest” with regard to total terms and propositions 
required for an explanation (e.g., Barger & Grandey, 2006). The third 
approach involves testing the direction and magnitude of effect sizes 
predicted by the two theories, across a range of studies (e.g., Thau & 
Mitchell, 2010). Fourth, scholars may apply a comparison of the pre-
dictive robustness of two theories, favoring the theory which best de-
scribes stable relationships across a greater range of predictors and 
criteria (e.g., Reynolds, Dang, Yam, & Leavitt, 2014). Finally, the most 
definitive approach to theory pruning involves carefully constructing 
tests where two truly incompatible theories are introduced in the same 
space. Within this approach, a finding in support of propositions from 
one theory may seriously call into questions propositions from the 
second theory (Supplement 6). 
These approaches to theory pruning are often limited by the con-
straints of existing data or under-powered studies which are unlikely to 
be definitive. We will describe how a creative destruction approach 
may build upon the existing paradigm of theory pruning by combining 
these methodologies with best practices gleaned from the open science 
movement. 
3. The crisis of confidence in science 
Replication is a cornerstone of scientific progress, and can take the 
form of a direct/literal replication (same method, new participants), or 
conceptual/constructive replication (different method, new partici-
pants) (Köhler & Cortina, in press; Schmidt, 2009; Simons, 2014). Re-
plications of past findings increase confidence in a given phenomenon 
and can demonstrate the ability of theories to make successful predic-
tions. Furthermore, previous studies become the inspiration for future 
studies and orient researchers toward new avenues for theory expan-
sion. If prior work is not replicable, it is difficult to gain confidence in a 
finding or theory, and researchers will likely have a harder time finding 
productive avenues for new inquiry. Conducting conceptual replica-
tions, for example repeating a laboratory manipulation in a field set-
ting, or testing the same idea using different experimental approaches 
within the same paper, is already commonplace and rightly treated as 
important in organizational scholarship. In contrast, direct replication 
is far less frequent across fields of inquiry (Köhler & Cortina, in press; 
Zwaan, Etz, Lucas, & Donnellan, 2017). 
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Unfortunately, recent attempts at directly replicating findings have 
raised concerns about the strength of this cornerstone. Across many 
disciplines, including medicine (Begley & Ellis, 2012; Prinz, Schlange, & 
Asadullah, 2011), economics (Camerer et al., 2016; Chang & Li, 2017; 
McCullough, McGeary, & Harrison, 2006), psychology (Ebersole et al., 
2016; Klein et al., 2014, 2018; Open Science Collaboration, 2015), and 
the social sciences, broadly defined (Camerer et al., 2018), researchers 
have found that a concerning number of studies fail to replicate when 
the same methodology is repeated in new samples. At a minimum, these 
results pose challenges to our understanding of the phenomena tested in 
the replication studies. More broadly, the overall lack of replicability of 
prior findings poses a threat to scientific progress. The need to adopt 
more robust methodologies and achieve more reliable results is a 
common challenge for psychology, management, education, ecology, 
medicine, and other fields (Agnoli, Wicherts, Veldkamp, Albiero, & 
Cubelli, 2017; Bedeian, Taylor, & Miller, 2010; Fraser, Parker, 
Nakagawa, Barnett, & Fidler, 2018; John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012; 
Ramagopalan et al., 2014; Makel et al., 2019). 
These concerns surrounding replication and research practices ap-
pear similarly relevant within myriad organizational literatures and 
across management research methodologies (Bamberger, 2019; Bergh 
et al., 2017; Pratt, Kaplan, & Whittington, 2019; Aguinis & Solarino, in 
press). While our search was unable to identify a systematic assessment 
of the direct replicability of organizational behavior or human re-
sources research, a survey by Bedeian et al. (2010) found that the 
majority of organizational scholars had first-hand knowledge of ques-
tionable research practices, which are likely fueling poor replicability 
across methodologies and domains of inquiry (Byington & Felps, 2017). 
Other meta-scientific work identifies a “Chrysalis Effect” such that 
published articles in management are far more likely to report statis-
tically significant effects than are unpublished dissertations on the same 
research (Cairo et al., in press; O’Boyle, Banks, & Gonzalez-Mulé, 2017). 
Such findings are especially alarming at a time when popular press 
books, TED talks, and podcasts allow for interesting or provocative 
management research findings to reach a broad practitioner audience 
and make their way into practice. 
4. The informational value critique of replications 
Researchers do update their beliefs about prior findings in light of 
replications. For instance, in prediction markets, researchers have less 
confidence in a finding in light of a failed replication (Dreber et al., 
2015). Conversely, researchers report more confidence in a finding 
following a successful replication. From a Bayesian perspective, these 
adjustments seem sensible. Researchers should update their priors 
concerning research claims in response to new information about those 
claims. 
However, the information provided by replications may be more 
ambiguous than is often appreciated. Critics have pointed out that there 
are many reasons why a replication study might fail to support the 
original predictions (Schwarz & Strack, 2014; Strack, 2016; Stroebe & 
Strack, 2014; Petty & Cacioppo, 2016; Schnall, 2014). The original 
study may have been a false positive, meaning that there was no “true” 
effect for the replication study to detect. Conversely, the replication 
may have been underpowered, making the observed null effect a false 
negative. It is also possible that the replication study used suboptimal 
methods for eliciting the effect (Luttrell, Petty, & Xu, 2017). Even when 
the same methodology from an original study is used, it is possible that 
those methods are not applicable to the setting or sample of the re-
plication (Schwarz & Strack, 2014). Finally, it is possible that there are 
unknown moderators of the finding in question that systematically 
varied between the original study and replication contexts 
(Schweinsberg et al., 2016). 
Despite these challenges, replication studies can be designed to re-
duce some of this ambiguity. For instance, some scholars have ad-
vocated for adding conditions and measures to replications to test new 
research questions in addition to those tested in the original study, such 
as an a priori individual differences moderator (Brainerd & Reyna, 
2018). Although post-hoc appeals to “hidden moderators” are generally 
unpersuasive, especially in light of the low cross-site heterogeneity of 
effects that fail to replicate (Klein et al., 2018), contextual moderators 
that were predicted beforehand and then demonstrated empirically can 
be extremely informative. The creative destruction approach adopts 
and extends this mentality, arguing replications are the perfect ground 
for systematic theory pruning. 
5. A creative destruction approach to organizational scholarship 
Drawing on the concept of Schumpeter’s gale in a capitalistic 
economy (Schumpeter, 1942/1994), in which outmoded organizations 
and processes are continually replaced by newer, more effective ones, 
we argue that replication initiatives should regularly pit competing 
ideas against one another. Adding new conditions, measures, and sub-
ject populations to replication designs allows for accomplishing so 
much more than merely supporting the original findings or producing 
null results. It could prove an ineffective use of resources to conduct a 
large-scale replication assessing many moderators if the original 
finding, or context sensitivity of that finding, were the only theoreti-
cally interesting outcome. However, one of the goals of the creative 
destruction approach is to introduce further theories and expected 
findings, such that a completely different pattern of results can still be 
highly informative. Through this process, outmoded intellectual ideas 
can be replaced with revised, stronger theories with greater explanatory 
power (see Fig. 1). 
The creative destruction approach is fully aligned with existing 
epistemological goals of theory pruning, but is distinct in leveraging 
open science innovations, such as direct replication and pre-registration 
of predictions, to achieve especially strong inferences (Platt, 1964). 
There are at least four key defining characteristics that enhance the 
effectiveness of a creative destruction approach. Specifically: 1. testing 
at least two competing theoretical frameworks using new data; 2. in-
cluding sufficient measures and operationalizations of key constructs to 
carry out both direct and conceptual replications; 3. applying maximum 
transparency, including pre-registration of analyses; and 4. relying on 
large samples in order to maximize statistical power to detect a speci-
fied effect size. 
First, traditional methods of theory pruning often rely on extant 
data to reconcile or compare theoretical predictions. For example,  
Schlaegel and Koenig (2014) used meta-analytic path analysis to ex-
amine two competing explanations for entrepreneurial intentions in 
predicting propensity to start a firm. Although such sophisticated 
analytic techniques are useful for combining studies testing different 
theoretical orientations into a single analysis, the full set of terms and 
propositions for both theories may not appear within any single existing 
study or dataset. Moreover, because research finding support for the 
proposed hypotheses is far more likely to lead to a publication (i.e., 
publication bias; Fanelli, 2010; Kepes, Banks, McDanel, & Whetzel, 
2012), available reports using such an approach are unlikely to result in 
the conclusion that a third explanation may be superior (i.e., that nei-
ther of the pitted theories is supported). By contrast, creative destruc-
tion involves collecting novel data, explicitly including measures for all 
key constructs and propositions specified by both theories, and allowing 
for the possibility that an unexpected pattern of results will emerge and 
neither theory will find strong support. 
Second, creative destruction leverages both direct (same method) 
and conceptual (different method) replication, including measurements 
and experimental operationalizations of as many key variables as pos-
sible within the competing theories. Although replication is not the only 
way to prune theory, it has distinct advantages in terms of the in-
formation it adds. In particular, direct replication is better positioned to 
cast doubt on the original findings that are the building-blocks for the 
original theory than are other replication approaches. This is because 
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null results from a conceptual replication can be readily attributed to 
deviations from the original method (Schmidt, 2009; Simons, 2014). 
Thus, direct replications are more suited to disconfirmation than are 
new conceptual tests. At the same time, conceptual tests have an im-
portant place, testing the generalizability and broader validity of the 
theoretical ideas. Notably, recent evidence indicates that prior suc-
cessful (i.e., statistically significant) conceptual replications do not 
predict a higher likelihood of direct replication (Kunert, 2016), un-
derscoring the importance of repeating the original method again. 
Strong theories should produce evidence that both directly re-
plicates and is conceptually robust to alternative approaches to testing 
the underlying ideas. As others have noted, it is possible that theories 
are true only within specific measurements of key terms; that is, they 
are highly sensitive to the approach to measurement or con-
ceptualization (Baribault et al., 2018; Landy et al., 2020). A strong 
theory should show a stable relationship across a greater range of cri-
teria and operationalizations of variables. Creative destruction aims to 
establish “neutral territory” with regard to how key constructs are op-
erationalized when placing multiple theories into competition. One 
pragmatic means of achieving such fair tests is to directly and con-
ceptually replicate a collection of past findings on the same narrowly 
defined topic (e.g., work morality, or gender discrimination), and ap-
plying multiple theories to them, often importing new measures from 
prior research within those theoretical traditions. 
Third, the creative destruction approach seeks to maximize trans-
parency in making critical decisions about how data is excluded and 
how hypotheses are tested. Scholars have increasingly discovered that 
theory-supporting findings may fail to replicate under scrutiny (Tsang & 
Kwan, 1999), in part because hypothesizing after the results are known 
(i.e., HARKing; Kerr, 1998) and publication bias may put forward only 
tests and patterns of control variables that support a conclusion 
(O’Boyle et al., 2017). Moreover, researchers often include multiple 
versions of a dependent variable or surrogate outcomes in their work, 
publishing only those relationships which demonstrate the largest effect 
sizes and best support their conclusions (Murphy & Aguinis, 2019). 
Possibly most troubling is the recent discovery that a large proportion 
of findings do not replicate, even when replication attempts simply 
involve subjecting the original data to reanalysis (Bergh et al., 2017). 
By contrast, novel creative destruction data collections create especially 
high transparency, such that all targeted relationships subject to testing 
are pre-identified, the statistical approach is registered in advance, and 
all variables measured within the study are visible and reported. 
Fourth, creative destruction draws conclusions from especially large 
sample sizes, as per the lessons of recent replication initiatives (Alogna 
et al., 2014; Klein et al., 2018). The problem of under-powered studies 
is well-known within management, such that equivocal results are often 
observed across investigations due to both Type I and Type II errors 
(Cashen & Geiger, 2004; Scherbaum & Ferreter, 2009). Further, each 
competing theory is expected to make predictions about both sig-
nificant relationships and weak to minimal relationships among the 
host of included variables and conditions. Thus, no theory has the un-
fair advantage of predicting only null effects, which can be confounded 
by problems with the measures or samples. 
Epistemologists have long argued that falsification tests play a cri-
tical role in advancing scientific knowledge (Kuhn, 1962; Popper, 
1959). Although management has lagged behind some other sciences in 
doing so, strong inference comparisons between theories have long 
been an acknowledged goal of organizational science (Davis, 2006). 
Tests which allow for the immediate support of one theory and rejec-
tion of the core arguments of another are likely to remain uncommon 
for myriad reasons (Leavitt et al., 2010), but the creative destruction 
approach may accelerate the ultimate abandonment of comparatively 
weaker theories. Science can generally not prove a theory correct or 
incorrect, but it can falsify propositions or statements which emerge 
from the theory (Lakatos, 1970; Popper, 1959). Lakatos (1970) argued 
that, as emergent propositions are falsified, the core of a theory be-
comes surrounded by a “protective belt” of boundary conditions, ex-
ceptions, and qualifying conditions. Although the core itself may not 
appear directly in jeopardy, the predictive belt of a questionable theory 
becomes dense and heavy enough over time to reduce its practical 
usefulness, leading scholars to abandon it in favor of less burdened 
theories. We suggest that a creative destruction approach can accelerate 
the accumulation of protective belts, and accordingly orient scholars 
toward theories without such constraints. Although neither direct nor 
conceptual replications can easily disprove a theory, when multiple 
theories are tested against one together, the accumulating evidence can 
Fig. 1. The creative destruction approach to replication, and its roots in theory pruning methods and open science practices.  
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suggest one theory has greater explanatory power to another and 
should be preferred. To illustrate this, we describe below the results of 
three recent creative destruction replication initiatives. 
6. Example 1: Culture and work morality 
Management scholars have long noted that work centrality and 
work values vary across countries, as a function of both differences in 
organizational forms (Parboteeah & Cullen, 2003), and deeply em-
bedded cultural assumptions (Bond & Smith, 1996; Hofstede, 2001; 
Schwartz, 1999). Tierney et al. (2019) recently applied the creative 
destruction approach to past experimental research on Implicit Pur-
itanism in American work morality (Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann, 
Poehlman, & Bargh, 2009; Uhlmann, Poehlman, Tannenbaum, & Bargh, 
2011). Unlike other religious faiths, traditional Puritan-Protestantism 
valorizes work as an end unto itself and path to divine salvation 
(Weber, 1904/1958). The theory of Implicit Puritanism argues for a 
founder effect in U.S. culture, such that the traditional values of the 
Puritan-Protestant settlers continue to shape contemporary Americans’ 
moral intuitions and behaviors related to work. The theory draws both 
on cross-disciplinary scholarship on U.S. culture (Baker, 2005; 
Tocqueville, 1840/1990; Landes, 1998; Lipset, 1996) and con-
temporary research on implicit social cognitive processes (Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995). Just as cultural racial stereotypes implicitly influence 
individuals exposed to the social context creating those stereotypes in 
the first place (Payne, Vuletich, & Brown-Iannuzii, 2019), traditional 
Puritan-Protestant values are hypothesized to implicitly influence not 
only devout American Protestants, but also non-Protestant and less 
religious Americans. 
Relevant experimental research (Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann et al., 
2009) finds that moral character inferences about a lottery winner who 
continues to work in the absence of any material need are highly fa-
vorable. Further, among Americans but not Mexicans, this “needless 
work” effect is sensitive to target age, such that a 23 year old lottery 
winner who continues to work is praised more than a 46 year old who 
does the same. Presumably it is more legitimate, from the standpoint of 
the Protestant work ethic, to retire after already contributing decades of 
hard work. Another theoretically expected moderator of moral judg-
ments based on needless work is the social perceiver’s mindset. Speci-
fically, thoughtless, automatic processing should promote the expres-
sion of implicit cultural work values. Consistent with this idea, 
American participants are especially likely to morally praise a person 
who continues to work after a windfall lottery win when making 
judgments intuitively rather than deliberatively. 
Further supporting the subtle and even nonconscious nature of 
Implicit Puritanism are the tacit inferences drawn by Americans 
(Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann et al., 2009). Specifically, American but not 
Chinese participants falsely remember a target person who violates 
traditional work morality (e.g., by contributing less work than others at 
their job) as sexually promiscuous, and vice versa. This implicit link 
between American work and sex values is theoretically forged, via 
cognitive balance (Greenwald et al., 2002; Heider, 1958), by their 
mutual links with American identity. In other words, since implicit U.S. 
work values and implicit U.S. sex values are both automatically linked 
with U.S. identity, they tend to be automatically linked to one another 
as well. 
The theory of Implicit Puritanism predicts and finds in a series of 
empirical tests (Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann et al., 2009, 2011) that U.S. 
work morality is distinct not only from Latin and East Asian comparison 
cultures, but also other Western nations such as Canada and the United 
Kingdom. The theory thus makes strong, readily testable predictions 
regarding work morality effects expected to be solely present in the 
United States. 
As shown in Table 1, there are also a number of alternative theories 
of work morality across cultures. The Explicit American Moral Ex-
ceptionalism perspective concurs that Americans exhibit a unique moral 
orientation towards work, but postulates that this is fully conscious 
(Baker, 2005; Lipset, 1996) as reflected for example in explicit en-
dorsement of the Protestant work ethic (Katz & Hass, 1988). 
Since the original experimental demonstrations of Implicit 
Puritanism relied on relatively small samples, it is possible the reported 
effects (e.g., tacit inferences drawn from work behaviors, moral judg-
ments based on needless work) are all false positives. Alternatively, the 
experimental effects could be reliable, but the originally observed cul-
tural differences (i.e., between the U.S. and other Western and non- 
Western nations) may not be. Of particular interest, work could be in-
tuitively moralized across cultures, with nothing special about U.S. 
work morality in this respect. This General Moralization of Work hy-
pothesis is indirectly supported by research on thirty-party punishment 
of noncontributors to group efforts (Dreber, Rand, Fudenberg, & 
Nowak, 2008; Jordan, Hoffman, Bloom, & Rand, 2016), and predicts 
that the experimental effects originally predicted by the theory of Im-
plicit Puritanism will replicate in any society. 
A distinct pattern of national differences is anticipated by studies of 
the effects of economic prosperity on national work values. Research 
relying on the World Values Survey (WVS) identifies a developmental 
sequence such that people in economically poorly off countries tend to 
endorse survival values, among these working strictly for material gain 
(Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). As a society becomes 
wealthier, there is a shift from materialism to post-materialistic values 
such as treating work as a source of meaning, self-expression, and ful-
fillment. This Self-Expression Values account suggests individuals from 
relatively prosperous nations, not only the U.S. but also for example 
Australia or the United Kingdom, should moralize work as an end unto 
itself. In contrast, individuals from less economically well-off nations 
characterized by survival values (e.g., India) should not. 
Yet another competing theoretical perspective argues that sub-
regions within nations are often just as, if not more, important than 
national borders when it comes to delineating cultural boundaries 
(Harrington & Gelfand, 2014; Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, & 
Ramaswamy, 2006; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Talhelm et al., 2014; 
Vandello & Cohen, 1999). Of particular relevance here, the Regional 
Folkways perspective (Fisher, 1989) argues there are multiple U.S. 
cultures—Puritan influenced New England, the plantation culture of 
the South (shaped by English gentry), the industrial culture of the 
Midwest (shaped by Quaker influence), and the ranch culture of the 
American West (shaped by Scotch-Irish migration). If so, then Puritan- 
Protestant morality effects originally predicted by the theory of Implicit 
Puritanism should be strongest in the New England region of the United 
States. 
It is also possible that individual differences in ideologies are more 
important in driving moral judgments of work than broader culture 
mores. For example, personally held religious beliefs, rather than a 
nation or region’s religious history, may best predict upholding tradi-
tional work morality. This Religious Differences perspective predicts that 
religious Protestants should be more likely than non-Protestants, and 
religious persons more likely than atheists, to moralize needless 
work—regardless of what country or countries the individuals in 
question are from. 
With regard to cultural divides within national borders, research 
highlights the importance of social class differences (Snibbe & Markus, 
2005; Stephens, Fryberg, & Markus, 2011). Both within the United 
States and other nations (e.g., Italy, Poland, Ukraine, Russia, and 
Japan), low socio-economic status (SES) individuals are more re-
lationally oriented and deferent to authority than individuals with a 
higher income and more formal education (Grossmann & Varnum, 
2011). Particularly relevant here, low-SES people also tend to regard 
work instrumentally, in other words as a means of earning income ra-
ther than a source of meaning and fulfillment (Argyle, 1994; Williams, 
2012). This Social Class perspective thus suggests the tendency to va-
lorize needless work may characterize high-SES individuals across so-
cieties. The original investigations of Implicit Puritanism (Poehlman, 
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2007; Uhlmann et al., 2009, 2011) did not observe any reliable in-
dividual differences based on religion, religiosity, or socioeconomic 
status, but relying on small samples were potentially underpowered to 
detect them. The creative destruction replications conducted by Tierney 
et al. (2019) allowed for high-powered tests of all these plausible ac-
counts of work morality across cultures (see Table 1 for an overview). 
Tierney et al.’s (2019) replication initiative re-examined the afore-
mentioned set of work-morality findings predicted by the theory of 
Implicit Puritanism (Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann et al., 2009, 2011). 
These included the previously observed patterns that (1) Americans are 
more likely to laud a young (rather than an older) person who continues 
to work after winning the lottery, (2) that this needless work effect 
observed among Americans is especially strong in an intuitive mindset, 
and finally (3) tacit inferences reflecting an intuitive link between work 
and sex morality in American moral cognition. These new data collec-
tions encompassed novel populations, including large samples from not 
only the United States and United Kingdom (as in Uhlmann et al., 
2011), but also Australia and India. Unlike the original investigations, 
participants were systematically recruited from all nine of the U.S. 
census districts, with the New England states strategically oversampled 
to facilitate high powered tests of the regional folkways account (Fisher, 
1989). Further included were novel measures, such as the Protestant 
Work Ethic scale (Katz & Hass, 1988) to allow for tests of the explicit 
American exceptionalism thesis (Baker, 2005; Lipset, 1996) and the 
validated Duke University Religion Index (DUREL) assessment of re-
ligious beliefs (Koenig & Büssing, 2010). The design thus encompassed 
not only direct replications of the original findings in the original U.S. 
samples, but also conceptual replications with new populations and 
measures, allowing us to test eight theoretical accounts of culture and 
work. 
The results of the cross-national data collection, encompassing over 
5000 research participants sampled from the constituent regions of four 
nations, were highly informative in terms of adjudicating between the 
competing theories. As summarized in Table 2, as a direct consequence 
Table 1 
Empirical predictions of competing perspectives on culture and work values.      
THEORY NEEDLESS WORK EFFECT TACIT INFERENCES EFFECT INTUITIVE WORK MORALITY EFFECT  
Description of key effect: 
The experimental finding the 
theories make competing 
predictions about  
A postal worker who continues to work after 
winning the lottery is perceived as a morally 
good person, especially if she is young (23) 
rather than older (46). In other words, target 
age moderates the effects of working for no 
reason on judgments of moral character. 
Women and men who fail to uphold 
traditional work morality are misremembered 
as violating traditional sex morality, and vice 
versa. 
The needless work effect is exhibited in an 
intuitive mindset, but not a deliberative 
mindset.  
Implicit Puritanism 
perspective: Americans 
unconsciously moralize work  
Americans, but not non-Americans, are 
sensitive to the age of a target who works 
needlessly. No moderation by individual 
differences in religion (Protestant or not), 
religiosity, social class, sub-region within the 
United States (New England states vs. other 
states), or explicit endorsement of the 
Protestant Work ethic (PWE). 
Americans, but not non-Americans, exhibit 
the tacit inferences effect. No moderation by 
individual differences in religion, religiosity, 
social class, sub-region of the U.S., or explicit 
PWE endorsement. 
Americans, but not non-Americans, exhibit 
the intuitive work morality effect. No 
moderation by individual differences in 
religion, religiosity, social class, sub-region 
of the U.S., or explicit PWE endorsement.  
Religious differences 
perspective: Religious 
Protestants moralize work  
Protestant and religious participants should 
be more likely to exhibit the needless work 
effect than non-Protestants and less religious 
individuals. 
Protestant and religious participants should be 
more likely to exhibit the tacit inferences 
effect than non-Protestants and less religious 
individuals. 
Protestant and religious participants should 
be more likely to exhibit the intuitive work 
morality effect than non-Protestants and less 
religious individuals.  
Regional folkways perspective: 
New Englanders moralize work  
Participants from the New England U.S. 
states should be more likely than others to 
exhibit the needless work effect. 
Participants from the New England U.S. states 
should be more likely than others to exhibit 
the tacit inferences effect. 
Participants from the New England U.S. 
states should be more likely than others to 
exhibit the intuitive work morality effect.  
Explicit American 
exceptionalism 
perspective: Americans 
consciously moralize work  
Americans, but not non-Americans, are 
sensitive to the age of a target who works 
needlessly. The effect is observed more 
strongly among individuals who explicitly 
endorse the Protestant Work Ethic. 
Americans, but not non-Americans, exhibit 
the tacit inferences effect. The effect is 
observed more strongly among individuals 
who explicitly endorse the Protestant Work 
Ethic.  
Americans, but not non-Americans, exhibit 
the intuitive work morality effect. The effect 
is observed more strongly among individuals 
who explicitly endorse the Protestant Work 
Ethic.  
General moralization 
of work perspective: People 
across cultures moralize work  
Both Americans and non-Americans exhibit 
the needless work effect and are sensitive to 
target age. 
Both Americans and non-Americans exhibit 
the tacit inferences effect. 
Both Americans and non-Americans exhibit 
the intuitive work morality effect.  
False positives perspective: 
The original findings are 
spurious  
No needless work effect or sensitivity to 
target age, and no moderation by individual 
differences in religion, religiosity, or sub- 
region. 
No tacit inferences effect and no moderation 
by individual differences in religion, 
religiosity, or sub-region. 
No intuitive work morality effect and no 
moderation by individual differences in 
religion, religiosity, or sub-region.  
Self-expression values 
perspective: Individuals from 
wealthy nations moralize work  
Participants from the USA, UK, and Australia 
should exhibit the needless work effect, 
whereas Indian participants should not. 
This theory does not anticipate the tacit 
inferences effect. 
Participants from the USA, UK, and Australia 
should exhibit the intuitive work morality 
effect, whereas Indian participants should 
not.  
Social class perspective: 
High-SES persons moralize 
work  
High socioeconomic status participants 
should exhibit the needless work effect more 
than low socioeconomic status participants. 
This theory does not anticipate the tacit 
inferences effect. 
High socioeconomic status participants 
should exhibit the intuitive work morality 
effect more than low socioeconomic status 
participants. 
Note. The table entries represent the extreme case in which a given theory’s empirical predictions hold to the exclusion of all other theories.  
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of the replication initiative, Implicit Puritanism suffers a theoretical 
core breach. One of the key original findings predicted by the theory 
(target age moderating judgments of needless work) fails to replicate 
entirely and is identified as a likely false positive. Two further effects 
(intuitive mindset moderating judgment of needless work, and tacit 
inferences based on work behaviors) replicate not only in the United 
States, but also in other nations, sharply contradicting the theory’s core 
claim of a unique American work morality. Due in no small part to the 
inclusion of additional measures and populations, we were able to 
identify alternative theories of culture and work values that better 
capture the observed pattern of empirical results. Specifically, strong 
evidence was obtained that work is moralized intuitively across cul-
tures. At the same time, partial support emerged for the prediction that 
needless work is moralized to a greater extent in self-expression cul-
tures (U.S., Australia, U.K.) than in a culture characterized by survival 
values (India). 
Further studies of implicit and explicit work morality across a larger 
number of countries are needed to adjudicate between the general 
moralization of work and self-expression values perspectives. A theo-
retical integration, such that work is moralized across cultures but 
significantly more so in self-expression cultures than in survival values 
cultures, seems viable. Regardless, scholars of culture and work can set 
aside the Implicit Puritanism thesis with confidence, and theorize anew. 
We believe this outcome underscores the utility and generative nature 
of the creative destruction approach to replication. Below, we describe 
another such initiative, testing different theories of how people reason 
about scientific evidence. 
7. Example 2: Working parents’ reasoning about child care 
choices 
Are we dispassionate information processors, drawing rational in-
ferences from the available data using a bottom-up approach? Or are we 
theory driven, accepting or rejecting new information in a top-down 
manner based on pre-existing schemas and expectations? Finally, is 
human reasoning distorted by directional motives to reach desired 
conclusions? 
An experimental approach is uniquely suited to addressing age-old 
philosophical questions regarding the extent to which reasoning is data 
driven, theory driven, and motive driven. By holding constant extra-
neous factors, measuring key individual differences, and manipulating 
critical features of the situation between subjects, investigators can 
empirically distinguish whether participants are objectively weighting 
the relevant evidence, confirming pre-existing theories, or striving for 
hoped-for conclusions. Using a now classic paradigm, Lord, Ross, and 
Lepper (1979) provide evidence that people with strong opinions on a 
controversial issue (e.g., the death penalty) evaluate scientific evidence 
in light of their prior beliefs. Specifically, when participants were ran-
domly assigned to read about studies with different methodologies and 
conclusions, their assessments of study quality were driven by the 
studies’ results (e.g., pro-deterrence vs. anti-deterrence) not the objec-
tive methodology (e.g., pretest–posttest vs. correlational design). A host 
of related findings speak to the influence of prior convictions on in-
formation processing (Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980; 
Mahoney, 1977; Pitz, 1969; Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975), which is 
arguably rationally defensible in Bayesian terms (Baron & Jost, 2019; 
Krueger & Funder, 2004). 
The cognitive vs. motivational underpinnings of such information 
processing are extremely difficult to parse—in fact, Tetlock and Levi 
(1982) pronounced the motivation-cognition debate potentially in-
tractable. Are participants, again potentially quite rationally (Baron & 
Jost, 2019; Krueger & Funder, 2004), less likely to cognitively accept 
new information that contradict their priors? Or, are they truly con-
torting the evidence and standards in order to believe what they want 
to believe? For example, decisions about parenting and family ar-
rangements impact the attitudes and behaviors of employees at work Ta
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(Desai, Chugh, & Brief, 2014), and work experiences similarly spill over 
into parenting behaviors (Stewart & Barling, 1996). Satisfaction with 
child care arrangements are a critical predictor of work-family conflict 
and consequent absenteeism (Goff, Mount, & Jamison, 1990). Thus, 
child care represents a critical domain in which employees should be 
motivated to invest substantial cognitive resources and seek to optimize 
their outcomes, but how such decisions are made would be differen-
tially predicted by various theories of reasoning. 
One admittedly imperfect approach to disentangling these pro-
cesses, introduced by Bastardi, Uhlmann, and Ross (2011), is to identify 
individuals whose factual beliefs and emotional desires are misaligned 
with one another, then examine how they engage with ambiguous 
evidence. Such situations in which what a person wants to be true and 
what they believe is factually true are diametrically opposed are highly 
theoretically informative, but also rare. One such case is parents-to-be 
who believe home care is better for children, yet intend to place their 
own future children in day care (e.g., in order to pursue a professional 
career outside the home). For such individuals, the cognitive ex-
pectancy that rigorous scientific research will support the develop-
mental advantages of home care conflict with their earnest hope that 
the science will find day care to be just as good for children as home 
care. Adapting the Lord et al. (1979) paradigm, Bastardi et al. (2011) 
find that such “conflicted” participants, when presented with the 
methods and results of purported scientific studies on the topic, favor 
whichever methodology (random assignment versus statistical 
matching) suggests day care is not disadvantageous for children. When 
motivational factors (hoped-for and feared outcomes) were placed in 
conflict with cognitive priors, the hopes and fears won. The wishful 
thinking paradigm has limitations, such as the difficulty of accurately 
measuring prior beliefs and desires, as well as changes in beliefs in 
response to new evidence. However, we believe it is informative re-
garding the motivation-cognition debate. 
At the same time, other work supports the importance of accuracy- 
driven reasoning (Devine, Hirt, & Gehrke, 1990; Funder, 1987; Jussim, 
1991; Trope & Bassok, 1982). From the standpoint of evolutionary 
adaptiveness, it follows that humans come equipped with reasoning 
abilities to help us construct a fairly veridical internal representation of 
the external world. If so then accuracy goals, either chronic or situa-
tionally activated in important situations, should explain the bulk of the 
variance in how human beings process evidence. 
Ebersole (2019, Study 6) recently conducted a large sample re-
plication-and-extension using the Bastardi et al. (2011) materials as a 
starting point, and further including an experimental manipulation of a 
priori commitment to criteria. Specifically, some participants were 
asked to indicate which scientific method (random assignment vs. sta-
tistical matching) they considered most valid before learning the results 
of scientific studies of the effects of home care vs. day care that em-
ployed those methodologies. Pre-commitment to criteria should con-
strain reasoning (whether based on cognitive beliefs or motivated de-
sires), promoting accuracy-based, bottom-up consideration of the 
evidence. 
In another extension of the original Bastardi et al., 2011 design,  
Ebersole (2019) expanded the populations sampled to include not only 
would-be-parents (as in Bastardi et al., 2011), but also actual parents 
who have made the choice to use home care or day care for their 
children. This allows for novel tests of the effects of hypothetical vs. real 
situations on assimilation effects. From an accuracy-based perspective, 
the higher stakes in actual situations should attenuate any irrational 
departures from the logical maximization of accuracy and realized 
value (Armor & Sackett, 2006; Carpenter, Verhoogen, & Burks, 2005; 
Levitt & List, 2007; List, 2006). This suggests parents may process new 
information about the efficacy of their child care practices more rig-
orously and dispassionately than non-parents. 
In contrast, theories of motivated reasoning make the directly op-
posing prediction, postulating that rationalizations for child care 
choices should be more evident among actual parents than would-be 
parents. Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance suggests that 
having already committed to a course of action in a consequential do-
main should increase the desire to justify one’s decisions. This suggests 
that parents who have already entrusted their children to day care 
should be more, not less, prone to motivated reasoning in this domain. 
Table 3 displays the theoretical predictions of the Motivated Rea-
soning, Cognitive Schema, and Accuracy-Driven perspectives on reasoning 
in the wishful thinking paradigm (Bastardi et al., 2011; Ebersole, 2019). 
While conducting direct/literal replications of the original method, we 
thus at the same time attempt to achieve what Köhler and Cortina (in 
press) call generalizability tests, in this case specifically testing mod-
erators about which competing theories make opposing predictions 
(e.g., parental status). The pre-registered analysis plans and study ma-
terials are available on the OSF (https://osf.io/9fy8m) and in  
Supplement 1, and the data and code are likewise posted online (data: 
https://osf.io/fhq45/, analysis code: https://osf.io/rphwv/). Notably, 
the creative destruction analyses were formulated and pre-registered 
after the Ebersole (2019) data collections were carried out, thus this 
Table 3 
Empirical predictions of different theoretical perspectives on working parents’ reasoning about child care.      
EFFECT MOTIVATED REASONING PERSPECTIVE COGNITIVE SCHEMA-BASED PROCESSING 
PERSPECTIVE 
ACCURACY-DRIVEN REASONING PERSPECTIVE  
Prior beliefs and the 
processing of evidence 
Beliefs only appear to influence reasoning 
because they are aligned with desires; when 
misaligned, desires trump beliefs in driving 
reasoning. 
Desires only appear to influence reasoning 
because they are aligned with beliefs; when 
misaligned, beliefs trump desires in driving 
reasoning. 
Prior beliefs do not influence reasoning about 
scientific evidence.  
Prior desires and the 
processing of evidence 
Desired conclusions influence reasoning 
about scientific evidence. 
Desired conclusions do not influence 
reasoning about scientific evidence. 
Desired conclusions do not influence reasoning 
about scientific evidence.  
Effects of pre-commitment 
to criteria 
Commitment to criteria should constrain 
motivated reasoning, and reduce the effects 
of desired outcomes on the processing of 
scientific evidence. 
Commitment to criteria should reduce 
ambiguity and constrain the application of 
cognitive schemas, and therefore reduce the 
extent to which prior beliefs drive the 
processing of scientific evidence. 
People already apply criteria in an objective manner, 
hence pre-commitment to criteria should not affect 
their judgments.  
Effects of being an actual 
parent vs. intended 
parent 
Actual parents should exhibit stronger 
assimilation effects than would-be-parents, 
since the psychological need to rationalize 
actual (rather than intended) child care 
decisions is greater. 
No predicted difference between intended 
parents and actual parents in assimilation to 
prior beliefs, so long as they hold the same 
cognitive beliefs about child care. 
If both are sufficiently accuracy motivated, neither 
actual nor intended parents will exhibit assimilation 
effects. If anything, actual parents should exhibit 
more objective reasoning about child care than 
intended parents. The stakes are higher for the 
former group, activating accuracy goals. 
Notes. The table entries represent the extreme case in which a given theory’s empirical predictions hold to the exclusion of all other theories.  
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constitutes a secondary analysis of the dataset (Van den Akker et al., 
2019). 
The results of this re-analysis (1) reproduced the pre-registered 
predictions of Ebersole (2019) regarding the effects of pre-commitment 
on assimilation to prior beliefs, and (2) pitted theories of motivated 
reasoning, cognitive schema-based processing, and accuracy-based 
reasoning against each other in a highly informative manner. Con-
ceptually replicating the assimilation-to-beliefs effect (Lord et al., 
1979), participants who had not committed to methodological stan-
dards rejected the methodology and findings of a scientific study whose 
results challenged their cognitive beliefs about the efficacy of home vs. 
day care. As hypothesized, the commitment condition eliminated cog-
nitive assimilation (Ebersole, 2019). 
The wishful thinking paradigm’s approach to teasing apart cognitive 
and motivational explanations for assimilation effects focuses on 
“conflicted” participants who either have children in day care or expect 
to one day, yet believe home care is better for children’s development. 
Such individuals’ cognitive beliefs in the superiority of home care are in 
conflict with their motivated desire to find out that day care is just as 
good. Our re-analyses of Ebersole (2019, Study 6) failed to replicate the 
original wishful thinking effect that desired outcomes trump factual 
beliefs in the assimilation paradigm. Directly contrary to the striking 
pattern reported by Bastardi, Uhlmann, & Ross, 2011, prior beliefs ra-
ther than desired outcomes predicted evaluations of the methodology of 
the scientific studies. Further, actual parents and intended parents were 
similarly likely to display assimilation effects regarding child care 
practices, failing to support theories predicting that high-stakes situa-
tions would be associated with stronger (or weaker) assimilation ef-
fects. Table 4 summarizes the implications of the creative destruction 
analyses for different theories of reasoning. Overall, the results most 
strongly support the cognitive schema perspective, in which new evi-
dence is evaluated in light of prior beliefs, not desires. Such cognitive 
confirmation effects are arguably compatible with Bayesian thinking 
and human rationality (Baron & Jost, 2019; Krueger & Funder, 2004). 
What drives human reasoning—do we follow the evidence where it 
leads us, tend to confirm pre-existing theories and expectations, or 
believe what we want to believe? A definitive answer to this very old 
question is beyond the scope of any original study or replication. The 
field could use further empirical approaches, for example experimen-
tally creating new beliefs and desires, varying the strength of arguments 
and looking at belief updating, or using longitudinal designs examining 
the dynamic interplay between beliefs and the processing of evidence. 
We believe the creative destruction approach, encompassing new con-
ditions and measures and direct as well as conceptual replications, can 
add value for future research on the nature of the reasoning process 
across topics. On that point, we report the results of a novel empirical 
study re-examining prior work on motivated gender stereotyping in 
hiring contexts. 
8. Example 3: Motivated gender discrimination 
Gender-based selection decisions have long been a topic of interest 
to organizational scholars (Harvie, Marshall-Mcaskey, & Johnston, 
1998; Olian, Schwab, & Haberfeld, 1988; Perry, Davis-Blake, & Kulick, 
1994). In an empirical study conducted for this paper, we apply the 
creative destruction approach to earlier findings regarding the roles of 
psychological rationalizations and illusions of personal objectivity in 
discrimination against women. The original series of experiments finds 
that evaluators shift the hiring criteria for the position in favor of male 
applicants for stereotypically male jobs, but do not exhibit the same 
favoritism toward female applicants (Uhlmann & Cohen, 2005, 2007). 
If evaluators were applying cognitive schemas based on gender ste-
reotypes to the descriptions of the applicants, then this should have 
affected the impressions formed of their traits and characteristics (e.g., 
perceived toughness or communication skills). However, candidate 
gender instead affected endorsement of hiring criteria (e.g., are Ta
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toughness or communication skills more important for the job of police 
chief?), with no effects on perceived applicant characteristics. 
Further consistent with a motivated reasoning account, decisions 
makers who flexibly change their hiring criteria to rationalize selecting 
male candidates believe themselves to be more objective (Uhlmann & 
Cohen, 2005). Providing evidence of a causal relationship, Uhlmann & 
Cohen (2007) show that experimentally inducing a sense of objectivity 
leads decision makers to rely more on their sexist beliefs, as well as use 
temporarily accessible gender stereotypes in their judgments. Seeing 
oneself as rational and objective may engender an “I think it, therefore 
it’s true” mindset that licenses individuals to act on their beliefs. At the 
same time, rationalizing judgments may reinforce an illusion of per-
sonal objectivity. 
Utilizing the creative destruction approach to replication, we con-
ducted a high-powered data collection combining key materials from 
both (Uhlmann & Cohen, 2005, Study 1) and (Uhlmann & Cohen, 2007, 
Study 3). Building on the original designs, we added conditions and 
measures testing competing theories of the effects of candidate gender 
on hiring judgments for male-typed jobs. To further test the original 
theory that hiring criteria and a sense of personal objectivity are con-
structed and maintained in a motivated manner, we included a ma-
nipulation of self-affirmation vs. self-threat (Steele, 1988; Uhlmann & 
Nosek, 2012). If the effects observed in Uhlmann and Cohen (2005, 
2007) are “hot” processes, they should be amplified under psycholo-
gical threat and ameliorated when an unrelated but important identity 
has been affirmed (Sherman & Cohen, 2006, 2010; cf. Dee, 2015; 
Protzko & Aronson, 2016; Hanselman et al., in press). 
Although the original Uhlmann and Cohen (2005, 2007) findings 
are consistent with a motivated account of gender discrimination, the 
experiments were based on small samples, and moreover conducted 
over 15 years ago. Studies of gender discrimination are a special case of 
replication as there are theoretical and empirical reasons to expect (and 
moral reasons to deeply hope for) change over time. While the rate of 
change in gender gaps in pay and leadership representation has slowed 
(Bar-Haim, Chauvel, Gornick, & Hartung, 2018), gender stereotypes 
about competence have changed over time (Eagly, Nater, Miller, 
Kaufmann, & Sczesny, 2020), and the #MeToo movement (Garber, 
2017; Johnson & Hawbaker, 2018) may have heightened awareness of 
mistreatment against women and the desire to take corrective steps. 
In contemporary times, ideological movements and social sensitiv-
ities may potentially lead to hiring preferences in favor of female can-
didates for traditionally male jobs. Thus, we examined whether parti-
cipants with high levels of exposure to the #MeToo movement on social 
media, and who strongly reject sexism and believe that gender limits 
women’s workplace opportunities, tend to render pro-female decisions 
(McCormick-Huhn & Shields, 2019). To the extent that such reverse 
discrimination effects are based on motivated ideologies (Ditto et al., 
2019; Greenberg & Jonas, 2003), they may be associated with con-
structing job criteria in favor of women, especially when threatened 
rather than affirmed. 
Finally, a related but distinct hypothesis posits that the lay public 
are increasingly study-savvy and wary of “falling for” experimental 
manipulations. If so, individuals who have participated in more re-
search studies, have taken a course in psychology, or are for any reason 
suspicious of the topic of study may exhibit overcompensation effects. 
In other words, they may prefer women over men for stereotypically 
male jobs, and provide female candidates with more favorable eva-
luations in general, in order to avoid appearing sexist. 
Table 5 summarizes the predictions of the Motivated Discrimination, 
Cognitive Assimilation, Motivated Liberalism, and Study Savviness per-
spectives on gender and hiring decisions in experimental contexts.  
Supplements 2–4 contain a detailed report of a creative destruction 
replication study putting these ideas to an empirical test. As summar-
ized in Table 6, the creative destruction effort yielded empirical pat-
terns in many ways directly opposite to those in the original studies 
targeted for replication. The original studies observed discrimination in 
selection decisions against female candidates that was most evident 
among male evaluators whose sense of their own objectivity was acti-
vated (Uhlmann & Cohen, 2005, 2007). In contrast, the replication 
found overall favoritism towards female candidates among male eva-
luators, especially if those participants were made to feel objective. In 
the replication study, only female evaluators exhibited the pattern of 
stereotype-based discrimination against women familiar from the 2005 
and 2007 papers, and this effect was not robust to alternative analytic 
approaches (see Supplement 4 and Table S4-1). 
In terms of explaining the observed pattern of reverse discrimina-
tion among male evaluators, the study savviness explanation and mo-
tivated ideologies explanations both received some empirical support. 
Participants who had previously completed similar studies, or strongly 
rejected sexist beliefs, tended to favor female over male applicants. 
Although the two can be difficult to parse (Tetlock & Manstead, 1985), 
it is more consistent with an impression management than ideological 
explanation that it was male rather than female evaluators who ex-
hibited reverse discrimination. Men are more likely than women to 
express a fear of appearing sexist (Soklaridis et al., 2018), yet less 
supportive of the #MeToo movement and feminism (Kirkman & 
Oswald, 2019; Kunst, Bailey, Prendergast, & Gundersen, 2019). Gender 
differences in self-presentation concerns in this domain track the pat-
tern of hiring judgments, whereas gender differences in ideological 
commitments do not. 
The original findings reflecting the motivated rationalization of 
discrimination against women did not directly replicate (Uhlmann & 
Cohen, 2005, 2007). Indeed, participants who perceived themselves as 
highly objective tended to construct hiring criteria favorable to female 
candidates, the mirror-opposite pattern of results to the original find-
ings. However, a novel conceptual test did partly support the motivated 
discrimination against women account. Specifically, male evaluators 
who experienced a self-threat (relative to a self-affirmation) became 
less likely to favor female over male candidates for the stereotypically 
male-typed job of police chief. This effect of the threat-affirmation 
manipulation suggests the tantalizing possibility of a theoretical in-
tegration. Specifically, contemporary male participants in hiring si-
mulations who are more experienced and knowledgeable regarding 
academic research may overcorrect their judgments, exhibiting reverse 
gender discrimination out of a fear of appearing sexist. Yet, after re-
ceiving a blow to their identity, ego-protection motives are activated 
and counteract this effect, so that their evaluations of female candidates 
become no better than those for male candidates. This mixed-motives 
account is highly speculative, and awaits systematic testing and em-
pirical confirmation or disconfirmation. 
A complementary forecasting survey examined whether in-
dependent scientists were able to anticipate these replication results 
(see https://osf.io/nz48k, and Supplements 7–9 for the forecasting 
survey materials, pre-registered analysis plan, and detailed report). 
Prior work finds that scientists are able to accurately predict simple 
condition differences by merely reading the study abstract or examining 
the study materials (Camerer et al., 2016; DellaVigna & Pope, 2018; 
Dreber et al., 2015; Forsell et al., 2019). We tested, for the first time, 
whether scientists can likewise anticipate complex interactions between 
variables. In this politically charged context (Tetlock, 2005), we further 
examined whether scientists’ beliefs and values regarding gender 
moderate the accuracy of their predictions. Consistent with past re-
search, in our primary pre-registered hypothesis test, we found a po-
sitive association between the observed effect sizes and the individual 
predictions (beliefs) of the forecasters ( = 0.027, p  <  0.001). In a pre- 
registered robustness test, aggregated predictions, computed as mean 
predicted effect size of each of the 24 effects replicated, were direc-
tionally positively associated with the observed effect sizes, although 
this zero-order correlation was no longer statistically significant, 
r = 0.193, p = 0.366. A notable discrepancy between forecasts about 
selection decisions by male evaluators and the actual study outcomes 
was also apparent. Forecasters expected that both male and female 
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evaluators would prefer male job candidates (forecasted d = 0.357 for 
male evaluators; forecasted d = 0.110 for female evaluators, mean of 
the differences = 0.248, p  <  0.0001). However, only the aggregate 
forecasts about selection decisions by female evaluators were in the 
same direction as the realized results (realized d = −0.128 for male 
evaluators; realized d = 0.018 for female evaluators). As a con-
sequence, forecasters were less accurate at anticipating gender dis-
crimination by male evaluators relative to female evaluators 
(p  <  0.0001). A non-preregistered follow-up analysis revealed that 
184 of 194 forecasters predicted that male evaluators would dis-
criminate against female job candidates, directionally contrary to the 
replication results reported earlier (mean of the differences = 0.485, 
p  <  0.001). Thus, although the expected positive association between 
forecasts and outcomes emerged for the moderator effects, for some 
simple effects the association is in the wrong direction (negative) and 
significant. Among forecasters, individual differences in beliefs about 
gender did not moderate accuracy (see Supplement 9). Further research 
should continue to examine whether scientists can predict the results of 
complex experiments addressing socially sensitive topics, and what 
factors might facilitate (or impede) their accuracy. 
9. When the creative destruction approach will be most (and 
least) useful 
The creative destruction approach to replication seeks to not just 
support or cast doubt on the original finding (Dreber et al., 2015; Open 
Science Collaboration, 2015), but also to potentially supersede the 
previous theoretical account with positive evidence for a revised and 
improved theory (Tierney et al., 2019). Consistent with the results of 
other replication initiatives (e.g., Klein et al., 2014, 2018; Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015) our recent efforts to repeat the methodology of 
previous experimental studies in new samples failed to support the 
original theoretical predictions regarding Implicit Puritanism in 
American work values, motivated processing of scientific evidence in 
order to reach desired conclusions, and motivated discrimination 
against women. Increasing the information gain from these new in-
vestigations, the novel conditions, measures, and populations allowed 
not only for supporting or not supporting the original theorizing, but 
also generating positive evidence for alternative theoretical accounts. 
Specifically, this process of creative destruction supports the general 
moralization of work (especially in self-expression-oriented cultures), 
assimilation to cognitive priors regarding child care practices, and 
study savviness and motivated liberalism accounts of male evaluators’ 
decisions in hiring simulations. Testing multiple theories against one 
another with pre-registered analyses and both conceptual and direct 
replications facilitates strong inferences (Mayo, 2018; Platt, 1964). 
Although the present empirical applications are in organizational 
research and psychology, we see the creative destruction method as 
generally applicable across academic fields. We hope the three em-
pirical examples discussed here illustrate the novelty of our approach 
(see Fig. 1). Past replication efforts have typically compared the ori-
ginal theory to the null (e.g., Klein et al., 2014; Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015), rather than adding new measures, conditions, 
and populations to test multiple theories against each other. Further, 
past theory pruning efforts in the management literature have generally 
not relied on direct replication, pre-registration of analyses, and com-
plete data transparency. 
As with all research methodologies, the creative destruction para-
digm has important limitations, and is no “silver bullet” for generating 
scientific knowledge. Further, theory pruning is not necessary or de-
sirable in all circumstances. Accordingly, certain limits may inform 
when creative destruction may be most (versus least) appropriate and 
useful as a tool for theoretical competition. First, while creative de-
struction involves collecting data on “neutral ground” for all relevant 
theories, underlying differences in populations will always limit gen-
eralizability from any research sample (Hanel & Vione, 2016). Scholars 
must be aware of the very real influence of context in organizational 
research (Bamberger, 2008), and no single replication will be sufficient 
to cover all domains where a theory may be relevant. That said, re-
search within the creative destruction paradigm may develop a set of 
theoretical predictions and methods that can be applied across different 
topics and populations. 
The creative destruction approach requires that theories be well 
positioned for theoretical competition within a given phenomenological 
space. Theories to be tested against one another should be carefully 
examined to verify that they specify equivalent terms and conditions 
(i.e., sufficiently similar IVs and DVs), describe a shared context and 
population, and describe similar sets of unfolding events (Leavitt et al., 
2010; Mitchell & James, 2001). Moreover, competing theories should 
be considered for their methodological compatibility. 
The creative destruction approach is most useful as follow-up re-
search to an initial set of published findings—in other words, in the 
context of replicating or re-examining established research. This ap-
proach is meant to create a series of severe tests (Mayo, 2018) for 
competing theories. Severe tests often require a great deal of resources, 
both in terms of study design and participant recruitment. As such, the 
creative destruction approach will be most effective when there is a set 
of competing theories with each having an empirical basis of support. 
Such a basis will allow researchers to effectively design tests of each 
theory and will hopefully limit wasting resources on theories that were, 
a priori, unlikely to find support. 
At the same time, the creative destruction approach is most useful 
when each competing theory predicts significant and, on some level, 
conflicting effects. Theories can vary in their number of predictions in a 
given testing content, but each theory should make at least one positive 
prediction (that is, predict the existence of a significant effect). Theories 
can certainly make predictions of some null effects. However, a theory 
that only makes null predictions may in some circumstances be unfairly 
advantaged in a replication context, such that underpowered or 
otherwise deficient studies (e.g., use of methods that do not generalize 
to the new sample population) will be more likely to support that 
theory. Overall, the creative destruction approach will provide the most 
diagnostic information when competing theories make clear, non- 
overlapping, and ideally directionally opposed predictions. 
The creative destruction approach, then, is most effective within the 
context of well-developed theories. Whereas many theories within or-
ganizational sciences merely predict directional associations between 
pairs of variables (Vancouver, Wang, & Li, 2018), more precise theories 
are defined by their boundaries and limitations, including reducing the 
number of outcomes that would be considered consistent with that 
theory (Byrd, 2019; Edwards, 2010). Creative destruction, then, will be 
most useful when theories are already sufficiently bounded, such that 
the scope of their predictions can be reasonably captured within a short 
series of studies. Notably, mature areas of research inquiry, which are 
often those with the most well-developed theories, are also the most 
likely to suffer from theoretical proliferation. This makes them espe-
cially good candidates for strong inference comparisons (e.g., Thau & 
Mitchell, 2010). For highly advanced theories associated with large 
numbers of published empirical investigations, the creative destruction 
approach can be employed not only in novel data collections, but also 
in the context of meta-analytic tests for publication bias and evidentiary 
value in competing sets of findings (see Supplement 5). The ideal 
context, however, is likely to be Registered Reports, in which the 
methods, predictions, and analytic plan for a study are peer reviewed 
prior to data collection (He & Côté, 2019). 
10. Conclusion 
We propose that issues germane to the problem of theoretical pro-
liferation are intimately coupled with practices which contribute to low 
replicability. That is, the combination of incentives for theoretical no-
velty, sub-optimal research practices and a lack of replication efforts 
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have led to myriad (often contradictory) theories populating a given 
space. The need for solutions which simultaneously give us confidence 
in scientific findings while also circumscribing their theoretical limits is 
increasingly clear. As we have argued and demonstrated, the creative 
destruction approach allows for the application of strong-inference tests 
(theory pruning) leveraging best practices for open science. Creative 
destruction offers the strengths of both direct and conceptual replica-
tions, testing theories with multiple methods and measures, high sta-
tistical power, pre-registration of analysis plans, and novel samples for 
testing the key terms and propositions from multiple theories simulta-
neously. As Kuhn (1962) noted, faster-moving sciences are character-
ized by their tendency to create critical tests of their own proposed 
findings. By boldly testing our own theories using the best open science 
practices and subjecting them to creative destruction, management 
scholars may have the opportunity to not only increase confidence in 
our theories, but rapidly accelerate their development in the process. 
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